

## ECON 8040 – TA Session 3

Michael Kotrous


University of Georgia

September 8, 2023

# Today's Session


- ★ Homework 2 submitted
- ★ Homework 1 grades

## Problem 1, parts a,b,c




- ★ Sanity check: Should sum close to 1 ( $GDP \approx C + I + G$  for  $NX$  small)

- ★ Alternative calculation: Gov't Share  $\equiv \frac{\text{Gov't Total Exp.}}{\text{GDP}}$




# Problem 1, part d





- ★ Recent papers on declining labor share: “Superstar Firms” (Autor et. al, 2020); “Rise of Market Power” (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger, 2020)

# Problem 1, part e



# Problem 1, parts f,g



## Problem 2

Report trends and residuals for data series:



- 1 Generate  $\log(x)$
- 2 Fit linear trend  $\widehat{\log(x)}$  that minimizes sum of squared errors
- 3 Compute “Deviations” / “residuals”:  $\hat{e} = \log(x) - \widehat{\log(x)}$

How I did it in Matlab:

- 1 Compute  $\log(x)$
- 2 Matlab's `detrend` function fits line and returns residuals  $\hat{e}$
- 3 Trend  $\widehat{\log(x)} = \log(x) - \hat{e}$



# Problem 2, part a



## Problem 3

Prove properties of CRRA utility

$$U(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$

- a) Let  $f(\sigma) = c^{1-\sigma} - 1$ ,  $g(\sigma) = 1 - \sigma$ . Both are differentiable and  $\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 1} \frac{f(\sigma)}{g(\sigma)} = \frac{0}{0}$ . By l'Hôpital's rule,

$$\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 1} U(c) = \lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 1} \frac{f'(\sigma)}{g'(\sigma)} = \log c$$

- b) Plug derivatives into definition to show

$$-\frac{U''(c)}{U'(c)}c = \sigma$$

## Problem 3

c) Plug into definition

$$\text{IES} \equiv -\frac{\% \Delta c}{\% \Delta U'(c)} = -\frac{dc}{c} \bigg/ \frac{dU'(c)}{U'(c)} = -\frac{U'(c)}{c \left( \frac{dU'(c)}{dc} \right)} = -\frac{U'(c)}{c \times U''(c)}$$

→ Sensitivity of intertemporal substitution wrt 1% change in MRS

d) Use  $U'(c)$ ,  $U''(c)$  to show Inada conditions

- i. strictly increasing
- ii. strictly concave
- iii.  $\lim_{c \rightarrow 0} U'(c) = +\infty$
- iv.  $\lim_{c \rightarrow +\infty} U'(c) = 0$

## Problem 3

e) Show MRS is invariant to scaling of consumption.

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}$$

subject to  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t c_t \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t e_t; \gamma$   
FOCs wrt  $c_{t+s}, c_t$


$$\rightarrow \beta^{t+s} c_{t+s}^{-\sigma} = \gamma p_{t+s}$$

$$\rightarrow \beta^t c_t^{-\sigma} = \gamma p_t$$

For  $\lambda > 0$ ,

$$MRS(c_{t+s}, c_t) = \beta^s \left( \frac{c_{t+s}}{c_t} \right)^{-\sigma} = MRS(\lambda c_{t+s}, \lambda c_t)$$

## Problem 3, part e



## Problem 3

- f) Given  $\{\bar{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  is CE allocation when income equals  $y$ . Need to show allocation  $\{\tilde{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} = \{\lambda \bar{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  when income  $\tilde{y} = \lambda \bar{y}$
- Affordable using the budget constraint
  - Optimal using homotheticity of CRRA utility (i.e., MRS invariant to scaling of consumption)

## Problem 4

First *three* questions from the lecture notes

- ① Arrow-Debreu CE is allocation  $\{c_t^1, c_t^2\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and prices  $\{p_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  such that

A. Given prices, household  $i = 1, 2$  makes allocation that solves

$$\max_{\{c_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t^i$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t c_t^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t e_t^i$$

B. For  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ , market clears

$$c_t^1 + c_t^2 = e_t^1 + e_t^2$$

where  $e_t^1 = (2, 0, 2, 0, \dots)$  and  $e_t^2 = (0, 2, 0, 2, \dots)$

## Problem 4

First *three* questions from the lecture notes

a) Show prices are *not* constant. E.g., prove by contradiction

→ Suppose  $p_t = p$  for  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t^i)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p c_t^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p e_t^i; \lambda$$

→ By FOCs,  $\lambda = \frac{\beta^t}{c_t^i} = \frac{\beta^{t+1}}{c_{t+1}^i} \Leftrightarrow c_t^i = \beta c_{t-1}^i = \beta^t c_0^i$

→ By budget constraint,

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t p c_0^i = \frac{p c_0^i}{(1-\beta)} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p e_t^i \Leftrightarrow c_0^i = (1-\beta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} e_t^i$$

→ Contradiction: HH cannot consume infinite resources in first period



## b) Solve ADCE

- Derive Euler equation using household  $i$ 's first-order conditions

$$c_{t+1}^i = \beta \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} c_t^i$$

- Write  $c_t^i$  in terms of  $c_0^i$  using Euler

$$c_t^i = \beta \frac{p_{t-1}}{p_t} c_{t-1}^i = \beta \frac{p_{t-1}}{p_t} \times \beta \frac{p_{t-2}}{p_{t-1}} c_{t-2}^i = \dots = \beta^t \frac{p_0}{p_t} c_0^i$$

- Normalize  $p_0 = 1$ . Write  $c_0^i$  in terms of discount factor, prices, and endowments using budget constraint

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t c_t^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \beta^t \frac{p_0}{p_t} c_0^i = c_0^i \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t e_t^i$$

- Replace  $c_0^i$  in equation you wrote earlier for  $c_t^i$

$$c_t^i = (1 - \beta) \frac{\beta^t}{p_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t e_t^i$$

## b) Solve ADCE

→ Solve  $p_t$  using the market-clearing condition

$$c_t^1 + c_t^2 = (1 - \beta) \frac{\beta^t}{p_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (e_t^1 + e_t^2)$$

$$2 = 2(1 - \beta) \frac{\beta^t}{p_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t$$

$$p_t = \beta^t$$

→ Solve allocations  $\hat{c}_t^1, \hat{c}_t^2$  by plugging  $p_t$ , endowments in expression for  $c_t^i$  (be careful with sums!)

$$\hat{c}_t^i = (1 - \beta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t e_t^i$$

## Problem 4

### ② Prove equivalence of ADCE and SMCE

Exercise (optional): Show  $1 + r_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta}$ ,  $c_t^1 = \frac{2}{1-\beta}$ ,  $c_t^2 = \frac{2\beta}{1-\beta}$  in SMCE with same preferences, endowments as ADCE in Question 1. SMCE is allocation  $\{c_t^1, a_{t+1}^1, c_t^2, a_{t+1}^2\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and interest rate  $\{r_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  such that

A. Given prices, household  $i = 1, 2$  makes allocation that solves

$$\max_{\{c_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t^i$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_t^i + a_{t+1}^i = e_t^i + (1 + r_t)a_t^i$$

B. For  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ , markets clear

- i. Consumption good:  $c_t^1 + c_t^2 = e_t^1 + e_t^2$
- ii. Securities:  $a_{t+1}^1 + a_{t+1}^2 = 0$

## Problem 4

- ③ Prove First Welfare Theorem: Let  $\{c_t^1, c_t^2\}_{t=0}^\infty$  be CE. Then it is Pareto efficient.  
Suppose not. If proposition is incorrect,  $\exists$  allocation  $\{\hat{c}_t^1, \hat{c}_t^2\}_{t=0}^\infty$  such that

- i.  $\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(\hat{c}_t^1) > \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(c_t^1)$
- ii.  $\hat{c}_t^1 + \hat{c}_t^2 = 2$  for  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$
- iii.  $\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(\hat{c}_t^2) = \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(c_t^2)$

Sketch: Find  $\{\hat{c}_t^1, \hat{c}_t^2\}_{t=0}^\infty$  s.t i. and ii. hold. Use fact that log preferences are **locally non-satiated** and to conclude  $\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(\hat{c}_t^2) < \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \log(c_t^2)$ , which finishes the proof.